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20. RESTITUTION 
YEO Tiong Min 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL, DPhil (Oxford); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Yong Pung How Professor of Law, Singapore Management University, 
School of Law. 
Introduction 
20.1 In the year under review, there was one major decision from the 
Singapore Court of Appeal dealing with the relationship between the 
punitive legislative framework and the common law restitutionary claim 
by a principal against a bribed agent. In addition, several important 
issues on the shape of the law of restitution in Singapore received some 
airing in a number of cases. The three most significant issues related to 
the law on the recovery of contractual deposits, the nature and structure 
of the claim commonly called “knowing receipt”, the defence of change 
of position and the related potential defence of change of circumstances. 
Contractual allocation of risks 
20.2 Appeals from Firstlink Energy Pte Ltd v Creanovate Pte Ltd 
[2007] 1 SLR 1050 were dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The trial 
judge’s decision on the issue of total failure of consideration (discussed 
in (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at paras 20.2–20.3) was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal which concurred with the trial judge’s findings and 
decision (Creanovate Pte Ltd v Firstlink Energy Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 780 
at [31]). 
20.3 In Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 
2 SLR 655, the High Court dealt extensively with the distinction 
between the contractual and the restitutionary quantum meruit. The 
case arose out of a falling out between two siblings. The plaintiff had 
agreed with her brother the defendant jointly to enter the property 
market in Greater London through the purchase and refurbishment of 
residential properties for rent or sale through a number of joint-venture 
holding companies. Amongst a myriad of claims and counterclaims, the 
plaintiff had claimed for reasonable remuneration for her efforts in 
maintaining and managing the properties in London in accordance with 
an implied term in the contract with the defendant. Judith Prakash J 
explained (at [123]): 
Where there is an express or implied contract which states that there 
should be remuneration but does not fix the quantum, the claim in 
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quantum meruit will be contractual in nature. Where, however, the 
basis of the claim is to correct the otherwise unjust enrichment of the 
defendant, it is restitutionary in nature. 
20.4 The judge further pointed out that there could not be a claim in 
quantum meruit if there exists a contract for an agreed sum and that 
there could not be a claim in restitution parallel to an inconsistent 
contractual promise between the parties (at [123]). 
20.5 The court held that the claim succeeded based on an implied 
term in the contract for remuneration. The quantum meruit claim, 
therefore, succeeded on the contractual basis (at [126]). There was, 
therefore, no need to deal with the restitutionary quantum meruit as 
such. As far as this claim went, the defendant had argued that the 
restitutionary claim could not succeed in any event because the claim 
could only be made if the contract was terminated prematurely as a 
result of the breach of the party against whom the claim was made, and 
that on the present facts, the contract had been terminated by mutual 
agreement and not by breach. The court observed that this was a “strong 
point”, but noted that there could be circumstances where even a mutual 
termination results in one party unfairly suffering loss, which could 
found a restitutionary claim (at [127]). 
20.6 In principle, it should not matter how the contract was 
terminated. For example, a contract terminated automatically by 
operation of law under the doctrine of frustration does not prevent 
restitutionary recovery (now modified under the Frustrated Contracts 
Act (Cap 115, 1985 Rev Ed)). Where a contract is terminated by mutual 
agreement, the parties may also have agreed on the restitutionary 
consequences (including the possibility that no restitutionary 
consequences should follow). This could be the “strong point”, but in 
the absence of any such contractual agreement, the normal 
restitutionary consequences ought to follow. The context of the 
defendant’s argument suggests that the “strong point” could be a 
reference to the general reluctance of the courts to grant quantum 
meruit remedy to a party in breach of contract (Sumpter v Hedges [1898] 
1 QB 673). This may, however, be contrasted with the more liberal 
judicial approach to allow the party in breach to recover money paid out 
on the basis of total failure of consideration (Rover International v 
Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 912 and Dies v British and 
International Mining and Finance Corp [1939] 1 KB 724, both cited with 
approval though distinguished on the facts in Energy Shipping Co Ltd v 
UDL Shipping (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR 25 (CA) at [36]–[40]. 
See also Mayson v Clouet [1924] 1 AC 980 (PC Singapore)). 
20.7 Perhaps more interesting is the observation that in appropriate 
cases, the loss suffered by the party in breach could be the foundation of 
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a restitutionary claim. The court had earlier observed that the 
restitutionary quantum meruit claim was based on correcting the unjust 
enrichment of the innocent party to the contract. This probably 
highlights the subtractive nature of this type of restitutionary claim, 
ie, the enrichment was at the expense of (ie, loss suffered by) the party in 
breach, although it could also possibly refer to an alternative basis to the 
law of unjust enrichment, focussing instead on the efforts of the party 
conferring the benefit as the foundation of the claim. Some have argued, 
for example, for a principle of unjust reliance (J Beatson, “Benefit, 
Reliance and the Structure of Unjust Enrichment” in Use and Abuse of 
Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 1991) ch 2) or unjust 
sacrifice (S Stoljar, “Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice” (1987) 
50 MLR 603) in such cases. 
Recovery of deposits 
20.8 Two Singapore cases dealt with the question of recovery of 
deposits after a contract has been discharged for breach. As the relevant 
law is complex, some background exposition is necessary before turning 
to the discussion of the decisions. A deposit may be recoverable by the 
innocent party to the breach of contract under an express or implied 
contractual right, or under the law of restitution. This chapter is 
concerned with the recovery of a deposit by the party in breach of 
contract. The defaulting party ordinarily does not have a contractual 
right to recover the deposit, and any claim would have to be made under 
the law of restitution. 
Penalty in liquidated damages 
20.9 The law on penalties disguised as liquidated damages clauses is 
fairly clear today, despite a complex history of the mingling of common 
law and equity. Equity took the first steps to relieve against penalties. 
Statute law then compelled the common law courts to relieve against 
common money bonds and penal bonds to enforce covenant ((1705) 
4 & 5 Anne c 16, ss 12–13 and (1696) 8 & 9 William III c 11, s 8). Taking 
the lead from equity and statute, the common law fashioned its own 
rules after equity. The pre-Judicature common law is exemplified in 
Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141 at 148; 130 ER 1234 at 1237 where 
Tindal CJ said: 
If therefore on the one hand the Plaintiff had neglected to make a 
single payment of £3 6s. 8d. a day, or on the other hand the defendant 
had refused to conform to any usual regulation of the theatre, however 
minute or unimportant, it must have been contended that the clause 
in question in either case would have given the stipulated damages of 
£1000. But that a very large sum should become immediately payable 
in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the 
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former should not be considered as a penalty, appears to be a 
contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which Courts 
of Equity have always relieved, and against which Courts of Law have, 
in modern times, endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess 
the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement. 
20.10 The penalty rule has been variously described as a common law 
rule (Bingham LJ in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual 
Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 443 at 439) or an equitable rule (Lord 
Diplock in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 
at 850), or more correctly, as a mixture of both. Dillon LJ in Jobson v 
Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026 at 1033 said: 
Now that the jurisdictional differences between the courts of common 
law and equity no longer exist, any court, English or Scottish, when 
faced with a claim for a sum of money payable on default which it 
identifies as a penalty, must refuse to enforce the penal part of the sum 
and must give judgment for the claimant merely for the actual 
damages suffered by the claimant, with, as appropriate, interest and 
costs. 
20.11 Thus, in the modern law, there is no practical need to 
distinguish between common law and equity as far as the penalty rule is 
concerned, when it comes to the enforcement of liquidated damages. In 
both cases, the consequence of finding the clause to be a penalty is that 
the court will not allow the clause to be enforced beyond the legally 
recoverable damages (Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026 at 1033–
1034, 1040–1041). 
Penalty in deposits 
The position at common law 
20.12 The law relating to the recovery of deposits, however, developed 
along a different route, and the law, especially the relationship between 
common law and equity, is still unsettled. Deposits are usually paid 
upfront to be forfeited upon breach, while liquidated damages are not 
payable until breach. But this distinction is chronological, and it 
virtually disappears when the innocent party is suing for an unpaid 
deposit (see, eg, The Blankenstein [1985] 1 WLR 435 (CA)). The starting 
point is that, in principle, it appears that the same penalty rule should 
apply whether the sum involved is found in a liquidated damages clause 
or a penalty clause. Thus, in Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap 
Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573 (PC, Jamaica) at 578, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson said: 
In general, a contractual provision which requires one party in the 
event of his breach of the contract to pay or forfeit a sum of money to 
the other party is unlawful as being a penalty, unless such provision 
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can be justified as being a payment of liquidated damages being a 
genuine pre-estimate of the loss which the innocent party will incur 
by reason of the breach. [emphasis added] 
20.13 However, unlike the law on liquidated damages clause, the law 
on recovery of deposits developed along a different historical route and 
has legitimised the concept of “earnest money”, or a guarantee for 
performance (Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89 at 101–102). In other 
words, the law allows a non-compensatory function. Thus, the deposit 
may be retained upon breach even if it bears no relationship to the loss 
suffered by the innocent party. Neither the common law nor equity will 
relieve against it as a penalty: Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89 at 95; 
Mayson v Clouet [1924] 1 AC 980 (PC, Singapore); Union Eagle Ltd v 
Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 (PC, Hong Kong) at 518; 
Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] 
AC 573 at 578–579; Bidaisee v Sampeth (3 April 1995) (PC, Trinidad and 
Tobago); Linggi Plantations Ltd v Jagatheesan [1972] 1 MLJ 89 (PC, 
Malaysia) at 94. 
20.14 Nevertheless, the modern common law recognised the 
possibility of abuse, and, therefore, confined its indulgence to deposits 
which are reasonable in the circumstances (Workers Trust Bank Ltd v 
Dojap Ltd [1993] AC 573; Linggi Plantations Ltd v Jagatheesan [1972] 
1 MLJ 89 (PC, Malaysia) (“Linggi Plantations”) at 94). An unreasonable 
deposit will be treated as a colourable part payment (Linggi Plantations 
at 94). The common law will disregard the element of “earnest” in the 
deposit, and it may be recoverable under the law of restitution as a part 
payment (Polyset Ltd v Panhadat Ltd [2002] 3 HKLRD 319 (CFA, HK) 
noted in L Ho, “Deposit: The Importance of Being (an) Earnest” (2003) 
119 LQR 34). Of course, a ground for restitutionary recovery still needs 
to be demonstrated (see, eg, a claim for restitution failed because total 
failure of consideration could not be shown in Lim Lay Bee v Allgreen 
Properties Ltd [1999] 1 SLR 471 (CA) at [21]). 
20.15 The common law applicable to deposits remains distinct from 
that applicable to liquidated damages; the element of earnest for 
performance remains. It is evident that Lord Browne-Wilkinson was not 
applying the penalty rule in liquidated damages to deposits in Workers 
Trust Bank Ltd v Dojap Ltd [1993] AC 573. He said that it was difficult to 
define the test of reasonableness (at 580); in contrast, the genuine pre-
estimate of loss test is well-established. Thus, once a deposit is found to 
be reasonable, no inquiry is made as to whether it is a genuine pre-
estimate of damage or not: Triangle Auto Pte Ltd v Zheng Zi Construction 
Pte Ltd [2001] 1 SLR 370 at [9]–[16]; Union Eagle Ltd v Golden 
Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 (PC, Hong Kong) at 518; Polyset Ltd v 
Panhadat Ltd [2002] 3 HKLRD 319 (CFA, HK). 
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20.16 However, the common law position in Singapore has been 
thrown into some doubt by the Court of Appeal decision in Lee Chee 
Wei v Tan Hor Peow Victor [2007] 3 SLR 537. The case dealt with a wide 
variety of contractual issues, but for the present purpose, the facts can 
be simply stated. The plaintiff contracted to sell some shares in a public 
company to the defendant, and had received an instalment of the 
purchase price. The plaintiff sued for specific performance of the 
agreement, while the defendant counterclaimed for the return of the 
instalment payment. In the circumstances, specific performance was 
refused. In considering the counterclaim, the court said (at [84]): 
The invariable judicial approach to forfeitable deposits at common law 
is that the deposit will be forfeited to the payee upon the discharge of 
the contract on the default of the payer, irrespective of whether it 
would have been deemed part-payment had the contract been 
completed. [emphasis added] 
20.17 This was only an observation of the court since the court found 
that the instalment was part payment only and not intended as a matter 
of contractual construction to be security for performance. 
20.18 The statement, particularly the emphasis on the invariability of 
the common law approach, could be read to suggest that the test of 
reasonableness for deposits has no place in the common law of 
Singapore. However, no relevant authorities or arguments appeared to 
have been cited or considered on this specific point, and it is suggested 
that it would be taking too wide a reading of the statement to impute to 
the court that it would take such a restrictive attitude to the common 
law. It may be that the observation is to be confined to reasonable 
deposits. On the other hand, it may be that the court was expressing a 
preference to deal with the issue in its equitable jurisdiction instead. 
The position in equity 
20.19 The role of equity in the recovery of deposits is even less settled. 
The starting point is that different principles applied between relief 
against penalties and relief against forfeiture of proprietary interests 
(Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 (PC, Hong 
Kong) at 520; Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026 (CA)). Pacific Rim 
Investments Pt Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 3 SLR 1 (CA) at 16–17 
recognised that they were different forms of relief. The former has 
solidified into the rule mentioned in the earlier section on liquidated 
damages. As far as relief against penalties is concerned, equity will follow 
the law as far as unreasonable deposits are concerned: in such a case, the 
court will give relief by ordering the return of the deposit less any 
damage actually proven to have been suffered (Workers Trust Bank Ltd v 
Dojap Ltd [1993] AC 573 at 582). Conversely, in the case of reasonable 
deposits, it will not grant relief (see para 20.13 above). These principles 
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are not confined to contracts for the purchase of immovable property 
(The Blankenstein [1985] 1 WLR 435 (CA); Triangle Auto Pte Ltd v 
Zheng Zi Construction Pte Ltd [2001] 1 SLR 370 at [13]). 
20.20 Relief against forfeiture, however, remains fluid. Traditionally, 
equity treated the right to forfeit as security for performance only and 
would, in exceptional situations of unconscionability and injustice 
(Pacific Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 3 SLR 1 (CA) 
at 23), grant relief in the form of additional time for the party in breach 
to perform its side of the bargain. The jurisdiction has generally been 
confined to the relief against forfeiture of proprietary and possessory 
interests (Pacific Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 
3 SLR 1 (CA) at 16; The Scaptrade [1983] AC 694) and it is doubtful that 
it applies to commercial contracts unconnected with any interests in 
land (Pacific Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 3 SLR 1 
(CA) at 16; Sport International Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd [1984] 
1 WLR 776 (HL) at 788). 
20.21 The fundamental distinction between the two types of equitable 
jurisdiction was succinctly summarised in C Harpum, “Equitable Relief: 
Penalties and Forfeitures” [1989] CLJ 370 at 370–373. In its jurisdiction 
to relieve against penalties, the court is only concerned to prevent 
oppressive conduct of the innocent party in claiming beyond actual 
losses. The conduct of the party in breach is irrelevant; relief is not 
discretionary. On the other hand, the jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture is exercised by balancing the result sought to be achieved by 
the forfeiture clause against the nature and gravity of the breach, and 
the value of the property forfeited against the loss suffered. The court’s 
objective is not only to compensate the innocent party but also to 
absolve the party in breach, whose conduct therefore becomes relevant. 
In some cases, the same provision may be both a penalty and a forfeiture 
clause, in which case, both jurisdictions are potentially available and the 
plaintiff is allowed to choose which to rely upon (Jobson v Johnson 
[1989] 1 WLR 1026). But ordinarily, there is no retention of property in 
the payment of money, and the “forfeiture” of deposits or part payments 
is not used in the legal sense of forcing a transfer of property. 
20.22 In Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, the majority (Denning 
and Somervell LJJ) made the observation that the jurisdiction to relieve 
against forfeiture could be extended to the forfeiture of part payments, 
if it had been considered penal, in two ways: (a) by extending the scope 
of the jurisdiction beyond the forfeiture of proprietary interests; and 
(b) by extending the remedy, beyond the granting of additional time for 
performance, to ordering the return of money paid. In Workers Trust & 
Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573 at 582, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson had declined an invitation to pronounce on the 
correctness of this proposition. However, in Union Eagle Ltd v Golden 
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Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 (PC, Hong Kong) at 520, Lord 
Hoffmann said in respect of deposits paid in sale of land contracts: 
So far as these retentions exceed a genuine pre-estimate of damage or a 
reasonable deposit they will constitute a penalty which can be said to be 
essentially to provide security for payment of the full price. No 
objectionable uncertainty is created by the existence of a restitutionary 
form of relief against forfeiture, which gives the court a discretion to 
order repayment of all or part of the retained money. [emphasis 
added] 
20.23 This dictum clearly supports the application of the equitable 
jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture to penal deposits, at least in 
contracts relating to interests in land in a situation where an order for 
specific performance has been declined by the court (ie, the equitable 
interest of the purchaser in the property arising from the contract of 
sale has been forfeited – no relief being given by the court – by the 
vendor in accordance with the contract). A similar argument for 
extension had been presented to the Court of Appeal in Lim Lay Bee v 
Allgreen Properties Ltd [1999] 1 SLR 471. However, the court did not 
deal with the issue of law because it found that the argument had no 
factual foundation, and also because it held that the retention of the 
sum was sanctioned by statute (at [33]–[34]). In so far as Union Eagle 
Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 rejected the jurisdiction to 
relieve against forfeiture of the equitable interest in an ordinary sale of 
land contract where time was of the essence and performance was 
tendered ten minutes late, the case may not be totally consistent with the 
approach of the Singapore court in Pacific Rim Investments Pt Ltd v Lam 
Seng Tiong [1995] 3 SLR 1 (CA). However, what it says about relief 
against the forfeiture of the deposit is still relevant to Singapore law. 
20.24 The approach proposed in Union Eagle Ltd v Golden 
Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 is different from relief against penalties 
because it is discretionary, and the court may order relief on terms. Lord 
Hoffmann also referred to the restitutionary function of this relief. This 
overlaps with the common law restitutionary recovery in the case of 
unreasonable deposits, but it is perhaps not restricted by the need to 
show strictly that the elements of unjust enrichment at common law 
(eg, total failure of consideration) have been satisfied. Conversely, it may 
allow only partial recovery where the common law would have allowed 
recovery of the full deposit. The context of Lord Hoffmann’s 
proposition must also be appreciated: he was offering this solution as a 
less disruptive judicial intervention than relief against the contractual 
forfeiture of an equitable interest in land. However, the principle 
proposed, based on the discretionary judicial reversal of unjust 
enrichment, could potentially traverse beyond that situation. 
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20.25 Furthermore, given his acceptance of counsel’s concession 
(at 518) about not applying the genuine estimate of loss test to the 
reasonable deposit, it would appear that he was suggesting that, for the 
purpose of relief against forfeiture, a deposit may be regarded as penal if 
it is not reasonable or if it is excessive of a genuine pre-estimate of loss. 
This proposes a wider scope for the intervention of equity than in the 
case of relief against penalties. The extent of the difference in practice 
may, however, be narrowed if the issue of genuine pre-estimate of loss is 
in fact taken into consideration in determining whether a deposit is 
reasonable. This is possible because the reasonableness test remains 
open-ended. Similarly, the greater readiness of modern courts (see, 
eg, Murray v Leisureplay plc [2005] EWCA Civ 963; [2005] IRLR 946, 
especially at [55] and [114]–[118]) to look to the commercial reasons of 
the parties for including liquidated damages clauses in their contracts to 
validate such clauses may also practically narrow the gap. 
20.26 Given this backdrop, it was not surprising that the High Court 
in Metro Alliance Holdings & Equities Corp v WestLB AG [2008] 
1 SLR 139 found itself treading on somewhat treacherous ground. The 
plaintiff was interested in purchasing a sub-participation interest in a 
debt but was prohibited from taking a direct assignment from a bank by 
the master participation agreement. Following the bank’s advice, the 
plaintiff contracted with the defendant, under which the defendant was 
to purchase the interest from the bank and then assign the interest to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff paid the defendant some US$1.6m, comprising 
some US$1.46m as non-refundable deposit and the rest being interest 
and fees. A balance of some US$8.76m remained to be paid. The 
relevant clause, a “termination clause”, stated that the plaintiff ’s rights to 
the deposit and the subject of the assignment would be forfeited upon 
his failure to pay the deposit or balance of purchase price in accordance 
with their contract. The transaction broke down and the parties 
disputed the other terms of their agreement. The plaintiff sought the 
return of the US$1.6m. The assistant registrar decided that the plaintiff 
was in breach of contract in failing to pay the balance of the purchase 
price, that the “termination clause” was not penal, and that the plaintiff 
would not be granted relief from forfeiture. 
20.27 In the appeal to the High Court, counsel for plaintiff apparently 
conceded that the termination clause was not a penalty (at [18]). The 
court then spent considerable time deciding whether the plaintiff was 
entitled to relief against forfeiture. The court considered both the 
authorities on relief against forfeiture (noting that it may not extend 
beyond contracts involving the forfeiture of proprietary or possessory 
interests in immovable property) (at [20]), and the authorities on 
recovery of deposits (at [21]). However, the court apparently did not 
treat the two sets of authorities as raising two different points of law, 
and treated the facts as raising only the question of relief against 
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forfeiture. Without deciding that such relief extended to a commercial 
contract not relating to property interests in land (at [23]), the court 
found that the deposit was not unreasonable in the circumstances and 
held that there was in any event no ground to grant relief against 
forfeiture. 
20.28 The first point of interest arising from the case is why the court 
even considered the possibility of relief when it was conceded that the 
clause was not a penalty. Nothing in the existing authorities justifies 
relief from a non-penal deposit. The source of this oddity appears to be 
the way the case had been posed to and answered by the district court. 
To the question “Whether the Termination Clause in the WestLB-Metro 
Trade Confirmation is a penalty and therefore unenforceable?”, the 
assistant registrar had answered (see Metro Alliance Holdings & Equities 
Corp v WestLB AG [2008] 1 SLR 139 at [9]–[10]): 
No, not in the sense of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage 
and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 15 as the defendants were not seeking to 
enforce the Termination Clause but rather that the plaintiffs were 
seeking relief from forfeiture. 
20.29 This answer has to be read in the context of the further question 
whether the plaintiff were entitled to equitable relief from forfeiture in 
principle or on the facts, to which the answer was also: “No”. 
20.30 The assistant registrar was obviously mindful of the distinction 
between liquidated damages and deposits, and clearly meant that for the 
purpose of the claim for relief against forfeiture, the clause was not 
penal. That also explained why the answer to the next question was 
monosyllabic; nothing further needed to be said once the clause was not 
penal. 
20.31 The concession of counsel must therefore be understood to be 
confined to a fairly obvious point: the termination clause was not a 
penalty as far as any liquidated damages were being claimed (which 
were not). That simply cleared the way for considering the issue of the 
recovery of the deposit. 
20.32 The second point of interest in the case was that the High Court 
found that there was no ground to grant relief against forfeiture because 
the deposit was a reasonable one. It would appear that the test of 
unreasonableness in relief against penalties has been assimilated to the 
test of unconscionability in relief against forfeiture at least in so far as 
the latter applies to the recovery of deposits. 
20.33 This case, if taken as authoritative, would unify the law on 
penalties in the recovery of deposits, whether one pleads the case in 
common law restitution, equitable relief against penalties, or equitable 
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relief against forfeiture. Its status as an authority, however, remains 
unclear, as there were no explicit considerations of any arguments for or 
against such an approach, and the somewhat unconscious nature of the 
assimilation. It could also be explained on the basis that there was no 
evidence of unconscionability on the facts. 
Deposits: reasonableness or genuine pre-estimate of loss? 
20.34 In summary, it is clear that under Singapore law, a reasonable 
deposit will, at least generally, be enforceable. Equity will relieve against 
an unreasonable deposit as a penalty by ordering repayment. It is less 
clear whether a common law restitutionary action will succeed. 
Additionally, it is not clear whether the equitable jurisdiction to relieve 
against forfeiture applies to the recovery of deposits, but it may be that it 
makes no practical difference if the same test of reasonableness is used 
to determine whether the jurisdiction is to be exercised (see also 
para 20.33 above). 
20.35 Where should the law of Singapore go from here? The first 
question in principle is whether the distinction should continue to be 
drawn between deposits and liquidated damages. Many have argued 
that, to the extent that they both allow monetary compensation beyond 
actual losses, they should be subject to the same rules. Although the 
distinction between a liquidated damages clause that acts in terrorem 
and a deposit that acts as an earnest for performance has been said to be 
merely a semantic one (see, eg, Treitel: The Law of Contract (E Peele ed) 
(Thomson, 12th Ed, 2007) at para 20-137), there is something to be said 
for the cautionary role that is played by deposits but not necessarily the 
liquidated damages clauses. The prepayment of (or obligation to pre-
pay) a deposit gives the contracting party specific notice from the outset 
about the seriousness of the expected contractual performance and the 
consequences of breach. The limits of party autonomy are thereby 
drawn according to the functions of the clauses. As Lord Millett NPJ 
said in Polyset Ltd v Panhadat Ltd [2002] 3 HKLRD 319 (CFA, HK) 
at 165: 
The principle of party autonomy is, of course, a cornerstone of the law 
of contract. But the principle is not without limits, and it does not 
permit parties to contract in whatever terms they choose in all 
circumstances. It cannot be invoked to prevent a party from 
challenging a contractual term to which he has agreed which stipulates 
for the payment of a penalty (in the strict sense) in the event of 
breach. Nor does it prevent a party from challenging a contractual 
term to which he has agreed which stipulates for the payment in 
advance of a forfeitable deposit so large that it cannot be objectively 
justified by reference to the functions which such a deposit properly 
serves. 
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20.36 If the distinction is thus maintained, what about the 
relationship between common law and equity? There is much to be said 
for the position that common law and equity should approach deposits 
in the same way. Thus, in the case of a reasonable deposit, restitutionary 
recovery at common law will be precluded, and equity’s jurisdiction to 
relieve against penalties will not be exercised. However, no substantial 
harm is done by doing all the work in equity (see paras 20.16–20.18 
above), ie, all deposits are enforceable at common law, but unreasonable 
deposits will be subject to relief against penalties in equity. But some 
things are lost: jurisprudentially, relief against penalties is one rare area 
where there has been harmonious development of common law and 
equity; practically, the simple procedure for a common law claim for a 
debt is thereby lost. 
20.37 Where the deposit is unreasonable, it is an unnecessary 
complication to consider the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture. It may be argued that the equitable jurisdiction can still be 
relevant if the common law should insist on strict total failure of 
consideration as a ground of restitution; but the failure of a clearly 
severable part of the consideration may ground a restitutionary claim at 
common law: see (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev 325 at para 19.87. It may also 
be argued that the equitable jurisdiction is a more flexible one because 
the court may order recovery of less than the full sum of the deposit to 
take account of the losses suffered by the innocent party. On the other 
hand, the innocent party is always free to mount its own action for 
damages for breach of contract. 
20.38 Putting to one side the Union Eagle type of situation (Union 
Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514) where the forfeiture 
involves both an equitable proprietary interest as well as a contractual 
deposit, where the deposit is not unreasonable, should the equitable 
jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture be extended to the recovery of 
deposits? One possibility seen above (paras 20.22–20.25) is where the 
deposit is reasonable as earnest but nevertheless not a genuine pre-
estimate of loss. But the law will be caught in an internal contradiction 
if it says on one hand that a reasonable deposit is a legitimate guarantee 
of performance but on the other hand that relief will be granted to 
ensure that the innocent party gets no more than his actual loss. 
20.39 One possible rationalisation is to say (as implied in Metro 
Alliance Holdings & Equities Corp v WestLB AG [2008] 1 SLR 139) that if 
the deposit is not unreasonable, then it is ex hypothesi not 
unconscionable to forfeit it in accordance with the contract. This 
approach has the advantage of simplicity and certainty: the issue is 
resolved in one step, and the contracting parties are clearer as to their 
respective legal positions. This measure of certainty is important in 
commercial transactions. Further, it should not matter whether the 
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relief sought is the return of the deposit or the extension of time for 
performance to prevent forfeiture of the deposit. Either way, the court is 
being asked to relieve the party in breach of the contractually planned 
consequences thereof. Deposits in consumer transactions, on the other 
hand, may be the subject of relief under the Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act (Cap 52A, 2004 Rev Ed). 
20.40 Another approach is to say that there could be circumstances of 
unconscionability apart from the reasonableness of the deposit that 
could constitute grounds for relief against forfeiture. In such a case, the 
penal element in the deposit would arise from the unconscionable 
conduct of the party enforcing it (cf Romer LJ in Stockloser v Johnson 
[1954] 1 QB 476 at 501). Traditionally this jurisdiction is only exercised 
in exceptional situations of unconscionability where clear injustice can 
be demonstrated. But, in the context of contractual deposits, it is hard to 
pinpoint any unconscionability that will not also invoke some existing 
doctrine that would already enable the other contracting party to get 
out of the contract or to prevent or restrain enforcement of the deposit 
clause as a contract term: eg, estoppel, undue influence, unconscionable 
bargain, etc. On the whole, the reluctance of the court to extend this 
jurisdiction to commercial contracts not relating to interests in land is 
grounded on a sound inertia. 
20.41 There could, however, be a residual role for equitable relief 
against forfeiture in cases of forfeiture of instalments which do not 
purport to be deposits at all (and therefore not subject to any test of 
reasonableness), and for which the common law fails to provide a 
satisfactory restitutionary remedy (eg, if total failure of consideration is 
strictly insisted upon as a restitutionary ground). For example, if a hire-
purchase contract is terminated for non-payment near the end of its life 
after substantial instalments have been paid, where the hirer in breach is 
not ready and willing to perform (if he is, he could invoke the relatively 
more established relief against forfeiture jurisdiction to obtain more 
time). In consumer transactions, the Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act (Cap 52A, 2004 Rev Ed) may provide some relief if the 
actions of the hirer can be characterised as unfair under the statute (for 
example, the unfair practice of “[t]aking advantage of a consumer 
by including in an agreement terms or conditions that are harsh, 
oppressive or excessively one-sided so as to be unconscionable” in s 4(d), 
Sch 2, para 11). Small traders will not be so protected. To this extent, the 
issue of the scope of the equitable relief against forfeiture jurisdiction in 
Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476 remains an open one. 
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Knowing receipt 
Strangers and fiduciaries 
20.42 The other appeal in Creanovate Pte Ltd v Firstlink Energy Pte Ltd 
[2007] 4 SLR 780 (discussed at para 20.2 above), which was substantially 
concerned with issues of company law, was also dismissed. While the 
High Court had allowed the claims against the directors of a company 
for various breaches of fiduciary duties and of the Companies Act 
(Cap 50, 1994 Rev Ed) for the misuse of funds received by the company, 
one of the issues raised in the case was the liability of the directors of a 
company for the misuse of funds received by the company before the 
directors were appointed. The liability in this respect was pleaded as one 
for knowing receipt, and the trial judge’s dismissal of that claim on the 
basis that it had been inadequately pleaded was discussed in (2006) 
7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at paras 20.4–20.10. 
20.43 The Court of Appeal agreed with the decision of the trial judge 
(at [42]) though it disagreed on the interpretation of several important 
provisions in the Companies Act (Cap 50, 1994 Rev Ed). The Court of 
Appeal, however, noted that there was overwhelming evidence adduced 
at the trial suggesting that the directors had in fact diverted for their 
own benefit the entire sum advanced to the company (at [39]). On this 
view of the facts, it would be irrelevant to consider whether the directors 
could be liable in knowing receipt for the sums received by the company 
before their appointment; they would be primarily liable for breaches of 
duties while they were fiduciaries. 
Strangers to the trust no longer? 
20.44 Comboni Vincenzo v Shankar’s Emporium (Pte) Ltd [2007] 
2 SLR 1020 arose out of a typical e-mail scam. In 2004, the plaintiff had 
responded to an unsolicited e-mail purportedly from a Nigerian person 
who had recently come into a huge inheritance of some US$20m, and 
who requested for investment advice and assistance. The plaintiff, 
a retired banker and financial trustee in Switzerland, offered his 
professional services. The defendant was a company incorporated in 
Singapore and ran an international trading business from Singapore. 
The defendant traded with a number of Nigerian customers, selling 
goods to them. Because of strict currency controls in Nigeria, payments 
in foreign currency were invariably made through intermediaries. The 
plaintiff was persuaded by various parties allegedly linked to the author 
of the e-mail that various payments had to be made in order to secure 
the release of the funds from Nigeria. He was instructed to remit three 
sums of money, amounting to more than US$1m, to the defendant. 
Acting on instructions, the plaintiff included in all three remittances the 
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narration “by order” of L. L was one of many Nigerian customers of the 
defendant. Having received the funds, the defendant was instructed by L 
to apply the sums towards reducing the amounts owed by a number of 
Nigerian customers, including L. At the time of trial, a sum of some 
US$103,000 stood to the credit of L’s account. 
20.45 The trial judge, Kan Ting Chiu J, observed that the statement of 
claim left much to be desired in terms of stating the legal causes of 
action. They included claims that the defendant was liable in conspiracy 
(along with L and several other parties), that the defendant had 
knowingly participated in the fraud and had become a constructive 
trustee of all the money received, that the defendant was liable for 
receiving money mistakenly paid out by the plaintiff, and that the 
defendant had acted negligently causing loss to the plaintiff. The judge 
noted that by the time the trial opened, the issues were narrowed down 
to: (a) whether the words “for the account of” the plaintiff, in the first 
two remittances, created an express trust in favour of the plaintiff; 
(b) whether the defendant was liable to account to the plaintiff for the 
money received on the basis of knowing receipt; and (c) whether the 
defendant was liable in conspiracy. However, in the course of trial, the 
conspiracy claim was abandoned. 
20.46 The express trust claim was quickly dismissed. The evidence 
revealed that the plaintiff had no intention that the money should be 
held on trust for him. He had intended that the money should be used 
to release the funds from Nigeria. This aspect of the decision is 
unexceptional. The plaintiff did not appear to have argued a Quistclose 
trust (Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567) on 
the basis that the money was to be used only for a specific purpose (see 
T M Yeo and H Tjio, “The Quistclose Trust” (2003) 119 LQR 8 at 12–13). 
However, this argument was not likely to have succeeded in any event as 
it appeared that the purpose of the payment was not communicated to 
or accepted by the defendant. 
20.47 The claim in knowing receipt, however, took a curious turn. 
Proceeding on the elements of the claim as set out in Caltong (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 3 SLR 241 at [31], 
the court accepted that the plaintiff must show: (a) a disposal of his 
assets in breach of trust or fiduciary duty; (b) the beneficial receipt by 
the defendant of assets traceable as representing the assets of the 
plaintiff; and (c) knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets 
he received are traceable to a breach of trust or fiduciary duty (at [49]). 
20.48 The defendant argued that the money it received had never 
been subjected to any trust, so that there could be no knowledge of 
breach of trust (at [50]). However, the court accepted the defendant’s 
concession that it may nevertheless be liable in knowing receipt if a 
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remedial constructive trust is found against it (at [50] and [53]), and the 
rest of the judgment proceeded on that basis. The court held that the 
defendant’s conscience must be affected by actual knowledge or wilful 
avoidance of knowledge of the fraud. The court found that although the 
defendant had been alerted by the authorities in 2003 that some of its 
remittances may be tainted and had in the present case failed to follow 
the internal safeguards that it had instituted as a result, the most that 
could be said against the defendant was that it was mindful of the 
possibility of fraud, but the defendant’s conscience could not be said to 
have been affected in the circumstances. However, by the conclusion of 
the trial, the defendant would have known about the fraud and so held 
the remaining sum in its hand on constructive trust for the plaintiff. On 
the issue of whether the defendant had a clear conscience, the court 
drew no distinction between the issue of liability for knowing receipt 
and the finding of a remedial constructive trust. 
20.49 With respect, to say that the knowledge of breach of trust of 
fiduciary duty can be substituted with a finding of a remedial 
constructive trust to found liability in knowing receipt defies 
understanding. In the first place, it conflates a personal claim that the 
defendant should account for money received as if the defendant were a 
trustee with a proprietary claim to the property in the hands of the 
defendant. In the second place, it turns the learning on knowing receipt 
inside out. The purpose of the law on knowing receipt is to protect the 
trust and fiduciary institutions from interference by third parties (or 
strangers) to the trust or fiduciary duty. This is why their knowledge of 
the breach of trust or fiduciary duty is crucial for their conscience to be 
affected. If the third party is said to hold the property on a remedial 
constructive trust, then at once he is no longer a stranger to any trust; he 
is the trustee. From that moment on, his liability, whether to return the 
property in specie or to account personally for failing to do so, is qua 
trustee. Knowing receipt is superfluous in actions against trustees. 
20.50 As a matter of law, the proposition that there must be 
knowledge of an antecedent breach of trust before liability as a knowing 
recipient can attach must be correct, subject to the qualification that 
knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty in the disposition of the 
property may be sufficient, but on the facts this was not present either. 
This should have raised the red flag that knowing receipt was not 
relevant on the facts. Equity is ever ready to come to the aid of those 
defrauded, but knowing receipt is only one of the tools in the arsenal. 
Where B has deceived A into paying money to C, property in the money 
at law and in equity passes to C. Equity, however, allows A to rescind the 
transaction as against C if C is not a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice. 
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20.51 As Wilmot LCJ said of a third party volunteer who received a 
benefit from one under the undue influence of another: “Let the hand 
receiving it be ever so chaste, yet, if it comes through a polluted channel, 
the obligation of restitution will follow it.” (Bridgeman v Green (1757) 
2 Wilm 58 at 64, 97 ER 22 at 24–25). This is reinforced by the statement 
in Homeward Bound Gold Mining Co v McPherson (1896) 17 NSW 
Eq 281 at 319, that “equity will not permit any person … to hold a 
benefit which he derives from the fraud of another as against the person 
who, but for the fraud, would be entitled”, approved of in Lonrho plc v 
Fayed (No 2) [1991] 4 All ER 961 at 970. In Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 
14 Ves Jun 273 at 289; 33 ER 526 at 532, Lord Eldon was most explicit 
that the third party recipient would hold the property on trust: 
The case of Bridgeman v Green (2 Ves Jun [sen] 627; Wilm 58) is an 
express authority, that it is within the reach of the principle of this 
Court to declare, that interests, so gained, by third persons, cannot 
possibly be held by them; and Lord Hardwicke observes justly, that if a 
person could get out of the reach of the doctrine and principle of this 
Court by giving interests to third persons, instead of reserving to them 
to himself, it would be almost impossible ever to reach a case of fraud. 
20.52 These statements must, of course, be understood against the 
general backdrop of trust principles, especially those aired by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (“Westdeutsche”) at 705–706, 
where he explained that the essence of a trust was an affected conscience 
coupled with identifiable property. Thus, the innocent recipient will not 
be regarded as a trustee until such time as he acquires knowledge, even 
though the defrauded party upon rescission may have sufficient 
equitable interest at the outset in all the property received by the 
volunteer for the purpose of the law of tracing (Lonrho plc v Fayed 
(No 2) [1991] 4 All ER 961 at 971–972; El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings 
plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 at 734 (reversed on a different point in [1994] 
2 All ER 685 (CA)). This is not a remedial trust but a good old-
fashioned institutional trust. Indeed, the principles in the Westdeutsche 
case were applied by the judge in coming to the conclusion that the 
remaining sums were held on trust for the plaintiff (at [78] and  
[82]–[84]). 
20.53 On the present facts, in the case of all three remittances, the 
defendant had received the money as a volunteer, and had subsequently 
been instructed by L to utilise the funds received to discharge debts of 
various Nigerian customers (including L) and to extend further credit to 
them. On the basis of the finding that the conscience of the defendant 
was not tainted by the fraud, the result in the case can be justified on 
traditional trust principles without recourse to liability in knowing 
receipt or the open-ended discretionary remedial constructive trust. 
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20.54 While on the findings of fact the result was undoubtedly right, 
in so far as this case signals a tendency to abjure traditional trust 
principles and to rely instead on the remedial constructive trust where 
the arguments may be more open-ended, it threatens to push Singapore 
law down a dangerous and slippery slope. 
20.55 Moreover, it is not clear why the common law claim for 
restitutionary recovery of mistaken payment, which was the most 
straightforward claim (since the solvency of the defendant did not 
appear to be in question), was not pressed very hard. Liability would 
have been strict subject to the bona fide change of position defence. 
Although the court did leave open the question whether there had 
actually been change of position (see below), it would appear that under 
Singapore law at least the defence is disqualified by lack of probity 
(Seagate Technology Pte Ltd v Goh Han Kim [1995] 1 SLR 17 at 30) 
though the more amorphous test of unconscionability is used in English 
law (Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2004] 
1 All ER Comm 193, [2003] EWCA Civ 1446); thus, the same results 
would probably have been obtained on the facts. 
20.56 It is also unclear why its equitable analogue, the claim that the 
defendant held the property on constructive trust the moment it 
became aware of the plaintiff ’s mistake (Chase Manhattan NA v Israel-
British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105 (“Chase Manhattan”) as 
explained in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 715, and applied in Re Pinkroccade 
Educational Services Pte Ltd [2002] 4 SLR 867) did not appear to have 
been pressed, unless it had been argued as part of the case of the 
remedial restitutionary constructive trust. It has been argued elsewhere 
that the two types of trust are different (T M Yeo and K Tan, “Civil 
Remedies” in Developments in Singapore Law between 2001 and 2005 
(Teo Keang Sood ed) (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) ch 4, at 
paras 13–17 and 22). In any event, the same results are likely to have 
been obtained on the facts of the case, as the Chase Manhattan-type 
constructive trust will only arise upon the knowledge by the defendant 
of the plaintiff ’s mistake, and therefore attach only to the remaining 
sum of money standing to the credit of L. This type of trust is not 
without its own difficulties if it is applied as a general restitutionary 
proprietary remedy (see “Civil Remedies”, at para 15), but given its 
existence in the law reports of Singapore, it would, nevertheless, have 
been a simpler way to resolve the case, without engaging in the 
difficulties of the open-ended and discretionary remedial constructive 
trust. 
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Mistaken payment: Assumption of risk 
20.57 In Comboni Vincenzo v Shankar’s Emporium (Pte) Ltd [2007] 
2 SLR 1020 (facts summarised in, above, para 20.43), one of the 
plaintiff ’s claims was that the money was paid under a mistake of fact. 
In rejecting the argument of the defendant that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to restitution because he had voluntarily assumed the risk of the 
mistake in making the remittances, the court found that on the facts the 
plaintiff had not made any voluntary assumption of risk in making the 
payments. The court found that the plaintiff had been completely taken 
in by the conmen, and did not think that there were any risks in making 
the payments (at [68]). 
20.58 The test applied appeared to be a subjective one: whether the 
plaintiff consciously assumed the risk of mistake. This may be seen to 
follow from the fact that the test for whether the plaintiff made a 
mistake is also a subjective one. The question is not whether a 
reasonable person would have been mistaken but whether this 
particular plaintiff had actually been mistaken. Similarly, a “deliberate 
waiver of inquiry” is required to amount to an assumption of risk: 
Scottish Equitable plc v Derby [2001] 3 All ER 818 at [24]. If the mistaken 
party had acted recklessly, however, it may be open to the court to draw 
the inference that he had intended to pay in any event and so must be 
taken to have assumed the risk of the mistake. 
Restitution for wrongs: Bribery 
20.59 In the previous issue ((2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at  
paras 20.11–20.16), the High Court case of Carrefour Singapore Pte Ltd v 
Leong Wai Kay [2006] 4 SLR 412 was noted as having decided that the 
employer of a bribed employee could recover the amount of the bribe 
from the employee under s 14(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 
(Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) even though the employee had been ordered to 
pay a penalty equal to the amount of the bribe in earlier criminal 
proceedings under s 13 of the same Act. It was briefly mentioned in that 
issue that the decision had been upheld on appeal. The decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Leong Wai Kay v Carrefour Singapore Pte Ltd [2007] 
3 SLR 78 sends a strong signal about the anti-corruption stance of 
Singapore law. 
20.60 In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal briefly traced the 
history of the principal’s action against the agent to recover the bribe 
first in equity and then in common law, and then discussed the 
relationship between the two statutory provisions. The court held that 
the Parliamentary intention behind the provisions was to ensure both 
criminal and civil deterrence of corruption. 
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Relationship between statute and common law 
20.61 In (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at para 20.16, it was pointed out 
that it was not clear whether the civil action under s 14(1) of the statute 
was the same as the common law action. If it is different, the common 
law action had not been relied upon by the employer in the present case, 
but had it done so it could have raised the potential issue of election 
between the common law and statutory causes of action. The Court of 
Appeal has confirmed that the statutory provision is an affirmation of 
the common law action. 
20.62 The Court of Appeal cited with approval (at [9]) Lord Diplock’s 
analysis in delivering the advice of the Privy Council in T Mahesan v 
Malaysian Government Officers’ Co-operative Housing Society [1978] 
1 MLJ 149, of the corresponding provision in the Malaysian Prevention 
of Corruption Act 1961 (No 42 of 1961) (referring to s 30 which is in 
pari materia with s 14 of the Singapore legislation), emphasising his 
statements to the effect that the equivalent of s 14(1) gave statutory 
recognition to the common law right of the principal to recover the 
amount of the bribe from either the briber or the bribed agent, and that 
the equivalent of s 14(2) preserved the right of the principal to recover 
from the bribed agent damages for fraud in respect of any loss in excess 
of the amount of the bribe. Hence, the statutory provisions did not 
affect the existing rights of the principal at common law. 
20.63 On this view, there is equivalence and not overlap of causes of 
action. The principal may of course ignore the statute and proceed at 
common law. But if the principal sues under s 14(1), he is effectively 
claiming on the basis of his common law rights (in the broad sense 
including equitable rights) as recognised by the statute; the statute 
confirms those rights and clarifies that the orders made in the criminal 
proceedings will not bar the civil proceedings. Hence, there is in theory 
and practice no issue of election between a statutory cause of action on 
the one hand and a common law cause of action on the other. This is a 
welcome clarification of the law. 
Double disgorgement 
20.64 The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that there was 
double recovery as far as the employer was concerned. Reasoning from 
the basis that the employer clearly would have been able to recover the 
bribes from the agent at common law, it asked whether that right had 
been qualified by statute. The court concluded that the words of the 
statute were clear enough that the right was not so constrained, and that 
Parliament must have intended that double disgorgement could act as a 
further deterrence against corruption (Leong Wai Kay v Carrefour 
384 SAL Annual Review (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 
 
Singapore Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR 78, at [14]). The civil proceedings and 
the criminal proceedings were clearly distinct. 
20.65 The Court of Appeal also relied on T Mahesan v Malaysian 
Government Officers’ Co-operative Housing Society [1978] 1 MLJ 149 
(above, at para 20.52). The court noted that the Privy Council in that 
case had prevented the Federal Court from allowing effectively treble 
recovery. This was because the Federal Court had allowed the plaintiff in 
that case to claim both in restitution and in tort, in addition to the 
penalty amounting to the sum of the bribe that the defendant had been 
ordered to pay the plaintiff (this last aspect of the Malaysian statute has 
no equivalent in the Singapore provisions). Instead, the Privy Council 
required the plaintiff to elect between the restitutionary and tortious 
claims. In doing so, the Court of Appeal of Singapore noted, Lord 
Diplock stated that the order in the criminal proceedings against the 
bribed agent had no effect on the civil rights of the principal against the 
agent. 
20.66 As the High Court noted in the instant case (Carrefour 
Singapore Pte Ltd v Leong Wai Kay [2006] 4 SLR 412 at [7]), the Privy 
Council did not deal with the matter of the partial payment by the 
bribed agent in that case to the principal pursuant to the court order in 
the criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeal did not deal with the 
point either. Under Singapore law, there is no possibility of the penalty 
being ordered to be paid to the principal, so the issue does not arise 
squarely whether any payment to the principal ordered in criminal 
proceedings has to be taken into consideration in civil proceedings in 
determining the quantum of restitutionary recovery or the quantum of 
loss should the plaintiff elect to claim for tortious damages. There is no 
question of a windfall for the plaintiff. 
20.67 As noted in the previous issue, there remains a theoretical issue 
whether the common law restitutionary claim (assuming that it is not 
based on compensation) is based on deterrence or the prevention of 
unjust enrichment ((2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at paras 20.13–20.15). 
The issue is not wholly without practical effect, as the defendant may in 
other cases also plead that there is no unjust enrichment to be reversed 
as a result of criminal proceedings, eg, where profits of a breach of 
contract or fiduciary amounting also to a crime have been confiscated 
by the state. 
20.68 In underscoring that the principle of “double disgorgement” is a 
prominent landmark in the anti-corruption landscape of Singapore 
(Leong Wai Kay v Carrefour Singapore Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR 78 at [14]), 
the approach of the Court of Appeal rests the claim squarely on civil 
deterrence in this case. This decision says nothing about the claim for 
restitution for wrongs generally, assuming that it is a coherent category 
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of claims in the first place. The overlap between the civil deterrence 
inherent in at least some of these claims and civil deterrence generally in 
tort (and in some countries, contract) claims as well as criminal 
deterrence, remains a thorn on the side of private law. But this was not 
the forum to resolve this broader issue, as the court found the answer 
within the statutory framework of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 
20.69 It may be asked, if the public policy against corruption is so 
strong, whether the civil remedies (restitution and compensation) 
should be made cumulative as well. There are, however, two different 
issues: double recovery and double disgorgement. The policy against 
double recovery by the plaintiff was not operational on the facts because 
the penalty (unlike in T Mahesan v Malaysian Government Officers’ Co-
operative Housing Society [1978] 1 MLJ 149 (“Mahesan”)) went to the 
state and the plaintiff did not seek recovery under the law of torts. On 
the authority of the Mahesan case, this policy remains unaffected by the 
statute, and nothing in the Singapore Court of Appeal’s judgment 
suggests anything to the contrary. On the other hand, whatever the 
common law’s position may be on double disgorgement, it was 
overshadowed on the facts by the statutory policy of deterrence which 
was determinative of the results in the case. It is difficult to see that there 
can be a unified common law principle on double disgorgement. Much 
is likely to depend on the nature of the wrong and the circumstances of 
the case. 
Defences 
Change of position 
20.70 In Comboni Vincenzo v Shankar’s Emporium (Pte) Ltd [2007] 
2 SLR 1020 (facts summarised in para 20.44 above), another issue that 
the court dealt with, albeit by way of observation only, was the change of 
position defence. The court adopted the oft-quoted formula in Lipkin 
Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 579 that the defence will 
apply when the injustice of ordering an innocent defendant whose 
position has changed to repay or to repay in full outweighs the injustice 
of denying the plaintiff restitution, and the qualification that the 
defence is limited to defendants receiving benefits in good faith 
(at [70]–[73]). 
20.71 The court did not consider whether the defence applied on the 
facts. According to the court, the defendant could rely on the defence if 
it had been found to be a constructive trustee, and as the defendant was 
not found to be one, the defence was inapplicable (at [73]). Four 
comments may be made. 
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20.72 Firstly, it is not clear how hard the plaintiff had pushed the 
claim for mistaken payment under common law. The claim was pushed 
hard enough for the court to consider the defence of assumption of risk 
(or waiver of inquiry), but apparently not hard enough for the court to 
consider the defence of change of position. If the common law claim 
had been pushed hard enough, and in the absence of a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice defence being argued (there is no 
evidence of this in the law report), liability of the defendant for the full 
sums received being strict, the change of position defence would have 
been highly relevant. 
20.73 Secondly, it is ambiguous whether the court was referring to the 
defendant being a potential constructive trustee in the sense of being a 
real trustee over actual property (a remedial constructive trust having 
been argued), or being personally potentially liable for the receipt of 
money as if it were a constructive trustee (no trust over actual 
property). Given the way the claims were run and the tenor of the 
judgment, it would appear that the personal liability for knowing receipt 
dominated the trial and the judgment. The court was most likely 
concerned with the personal liability of the defendant. It is therefore not 
safe to regard the dictum as authority either way for the applicability of 
the change of position where the defendant is sought to be made a 
remedial constructive trustee over actual property. 
20.74 Lord Millett has clarified that the change of position defence 
does not apply if all that the plaintiff is doing is to ask for his property 
back (Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 at 129). In a real sense, this is 
what the plaintiff was doing if all he did was ask for the property in the 
hands of the defendant on the basis that the defendant was a remedial 
constructive trustee. However, the reason for the existence of the 
property claim in the first place should not be overlooked. This marks 
the difference between the remedial constructive trust as recognised in 
Singapore (which reverses an unjust enrichment) and the institutional 
trust recognised in Foskett v McKeown as the result of the tracing of 
property. In principle, the change of position defence ought to be 
applicable where a remedial constructive trust is imposed to reverse 
unjust enrichment; the principle in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd 
[1991] 2 AC 548 calling for the balance of injustice applies with greater 
force if the innocent defendant is being asked to transfer property. But 
the present case was not the forum to test this principle. (See, however, 
paras 20.77–20.79 below). 
20.75 Thirdly, the proposition that the change of position defence (at 
least the version in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548) is 
applicable if the defendant had been found to be personally liable as a 
constructive trustee presupposes that the basis of this equitable claim is 
the reversal of an unjust enrichment. It is far from clear under the 
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current state of the law that the liability of a knowing recipient is based 
on the law of unjust enrichment. The Australian court has resisted this 
approach (Say-Dee Pty Ltd v Farah Construction Pty Ltd [2007] 
HCA 22), although there is some obiter support from English cases 
(Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] 3 WLR 1913; [2002] 
UKHL 48 at [87]; Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164; [2002] 
UKHL 12 at [105]; Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 
at 386). On the approach of the court in the present case, there is at least 
a restitutionary dimension in so far as the claim is based on the alleged 
remedial constructive trust which is calculated to reverse an unjust 
enrichment. Given this special feature of the case, the proposition in the 
case provides no general guideline on the general applicability of the 
change of position defence to liability for knowing receipt of property in 
breach of trust or fiduciary duty. 
20.76 Fourthly, on the reasoning of the court that want of probity is 
the test for making the defendant a constructive trustee (whether in the 
personal or (remedial) proprietary sense), it is difficult to see when the 
change of position, which as a matter of hypothesis only applies if the 
defendant had acted in good faith, can ever apply to the liability of a 
constructive trustee. It should not be assumed that the law of restitution 
consists of a class of homogeneous claims, and it may be that the change 
of position defence may not be applicable to some restitutionary claims 
(see also (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev 345 at paras 19.77–19.78). 
Change of circumstances? 
20.77 The final point of interest in Comboni Vincenzo v Shankar’s 
Emporium (Pte) Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 1020 arose from the argument by the 
defendant that it did not have to return the remaining sum of money in 
its hands, on the basis that it wanted to use it to offset the claims that it 
will be making against L. The court’s response was that the defendant 
“cannot retain the sum unless there are proper grounds which excuse it 
from doing that” [emphasis added]. On the facts, the court found that 
the defendant had no right to use the plaintff ’s money to satisfy its 
claims against L. It remains to be seen what could amount to proper 
grounds that could excuse the defendant from returning the money. 
20.78 The starting point is that the restitutionary defence of change of 
position is not applicable in a proprietary claim that is not seeking to 
reverse unjust enrichment but merely seeks the return of property (see 
para 20.74 above). The claim to the remaining sum was not founded on 
the remedial constructive trust. However, the property regime can be 
harsh on the defendant without some kind of change of circumstances 
defence (see J D Davies, “Equity in English Law” in Equity in the World’s 
Legal Systems (R A Newman ed) (Bruylant, 1973) at p 181). Take the 
case of a recipient who has the requisite knowledge of an antecedent 
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fraud on the plaintiff. However, the defendant is himself quickly 
defrauded of the money, or perhaps an event occurs which wipes out 
the assets (eg, theft, insolvency of a bank, stock market movements, etc). 
It seems rather harsh that the defendant, especially if he had not done 
anything to demonstrate that he had appropriated the assets to his own 
use, should have to be held, as a trustee, to be accountable for those 
assets or their value. 
20.79 This could be a signal from the Singapore judiciary to move 
away from the intransigent refusal of English law to recognise a change 
of circumstances defence in proprietary claims. If developed (and 
something can be said for that), it will be the counterpart to the change 
of position defence applicable to restitutionary claims. 
Choice of law 
20.80 Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 
1 SLR 377 (CA) is not a case on the law of restitution as such, but it is, 
nevertheless, significant for the law of restitution in so far as it decided 
that claims which are founded on equitable principles, like claims based 
on breaches of fiduciary duties and breaches of confidence, are, if the 
equitable liability arises from a recognised legal relationship like 
contract or tort, subject to the law governing the underlying legal 
relationship. This was a significant contribution by the Singapore Court 
of Appeal to the scarce Commonwealth jurisprudence on a growing and 
important subject. 
20.81 However, it does create some uncertainty about the right choice 
of law rule to apply if the plaintiff is claiming an account of profits for 
breach of fiduciary duty arising from a legal relationship created by 
contract. On the reasoning in Kartika Ratna Thahir v PT Pertambangan 
Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR 257 (CA) that a 
claim for an account of profits based on a breach of fiduciary duty is not 
a contractual claim, such a claim will be governed by the law of the place 
of enrichment. Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull 
[2007] 1 SLR 377 (CA) (“Rickshaw”), however, suggests that this type of 
claim should be governed by the law of the underlying contract, not 
because the breach of fiduciary duty claim is contractual in domestic 
law, but because the fiduciary obligation arises from a factual matrix 
that is already regulated by a pre-existing contractual relationship. It is 
suggested that the latter line of reasoning is the more persuasive one. 
Although the Rickshaw case was not dealing with a claim for restitution 
to reverse an unjust enrichment but with compensation for breach of 
fiduciary duty, this is not a convincing legal distinction to make. 
(2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev Restitution 389 
 
20.82 In Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 
2 SLR 655 (facts summarised above at para 20.3), various allegations 
were made of breaches of fiduciary duties arising from a joint-venture 
agreement entered into in Singapore to use various holding companies 
(incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and the Republic of 
Seychelles) to purchase and refurbish property in England for the 
purpose of further resale or rental. The plaintiff was resident in England 
and took action to purchase various properties there pursuant to the 
joint venture agreement. The defendant was a solicitor resident in 
Singapore. The various claims based on breaches of fiduciary duties, 
including a claim for account of profits, were determined according to 
Singapore law, but no foreign law was argued in the case. There 
appeared to be very strong foreign elements in the case. Practically, 
however, it would probably not have made any difference as the only 
realistic foreign law candidate for the law governing the joint venture 
agreement was English law, and it is unlikely to be found to be different 
from Singapore law in this respect. 
